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W
hile there is little to celebrate in the current foreclosure disaster, one poten-
tial silver lining in the large number of bank-owned properties is the oppor-
tunity to turn those properties into community assets. A May 2008 confer-
ence hosted by the Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy at New 
York University and sponsored by the Ford Foundation brought together policy experts and 
practitioners to share best practices for “Transforming Foreclosed Properties into Community 
Assets.” Most of the discussion focused on what can be done by partners working together at 
the local level. The current situation is not, however, the first time that the federal government 
has faced the challenge of turning foreclosed residential property into affordable housing. In 
this essay, prepared for the NYU conference, we consider three earlier experiences with asset 
disposition by the federal government—the New Deal–era Home Owners’ Loan Corporation 
(HOLC), the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), and HUD’s Asset Control Area (ACA) 
program. In each case, the federal government was forced to deal with large-scale disposition 
of private-sector assets that passed into public hands as a function of federal funds put into 
an earlier, related transaction. 
In the case of the HOLC and ACA, default on federally guaranteed home loans trig-
gered foreclosure and transfer of the property to the respective entities. Both programs were 
entirely focused on residential properties. In the case of the RTC, the properties in question 
were already owned by failed banks insured by the FSLIC or the FDIC or were collateral 
on RTC-owned loans that proceeded to foreclosure. The vast bulk of the RTC’s loans and 
properties were commercial, although there was enough residential property to make the case 
worth studying. All three programs were challenged to maximize revenues from the disposi-
tion of the assets acquired while also not overburdening local markets already in a weakened 
state. In the case of the RTC and ACA, the mandate included a third element: preservation 
and expansion of affordable housing. Here we provide an overview of the three programs 
with a focus on their residential property disposition experiences. We conclude with some 
lessons we think we can take from these experiences and pose a series of questions we believe 
they raise for our current situation. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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The Home Owners’ Loan Corporation
The Home Owners’ Loan Corporation was established in 1933 and issued new loans 
through 1936. Homeowners would apply to the HOLC to refinance their existing loans 
through one of 458 local offices around the country. At its peak in 1934, the HOLC employed 
approximately 20,000 people, in addition to contractors paid on a fee basis.1 
When a borrower applied to the HOLC, the corporation would appraise the property 
and offer the borrower a new loan based on the property’s current value. In exchange for 
the lien on the property, the HOLC would offer the mortgagee a corporate bond backed 
by an explicit government guarantee.2 The homeowner was given a 15-year fully amortizing 
loan.3 To put the scale of the program in perspective, one out of every five qualifying owner-
occupied properties on which a mortgage was outstanding in 1934 was refinanced through 
the HOLC. Approximately one million loans were issued, with a total principal balance of 
$3.1 billion, or an average of slightly more than $3,000 per property.4 
As critics of the HOLC have always been quick to point out, roughly 20 percent of 
the borrowers re-defaulted to the point of losing their homes to foreclosure. The HOLC 
disposed of 198,000 foreclosed properties, although the process was spread throughout the 
corporation’s existence. The maximum number of properties managed was roughly 103,000, 
from early 1938 through early 1939, after which numbers declined steadily, with only 6,000 
properties owned by 1944.5
Many of the properties acquired by the HOLC through foreclosure required significant 
investment to make them salable, above and beyond any tax liens that needed to be paid. 
This was due to a combination of aged stock and neglect by the homeowners foreclosed 
upon. Properties were often rehabilitated to bring them in line with comparable local prop-
erty quality. Nationally, expenditures on rehabilitation averaged 11 percent of the original 
loan amount or about 12 percent of the net sales proceeds. All together, for the 198,000 prop-
erties acquired by the HOLC, rehabilitation costs came to $89 million, or $451 per property. 
HOLC’s property management division relied on a combination of its own employees and 
contractors to fulfill a range of tasks.6 
HOLC engaged in a surprising amount of due diligence in advance of acquiring proper-
ties. When the various loss-mitigation strategies employed by the corporation seemed to fail, 
setting a property on the path to foreclosure, HOLC would reappraise the property using 
1  Home Owners Loan Act of 1933; see also The FHA Story in Summary, Federal Housing Administration, 1960, 
140, 145.
2  Originally the government only guaranteed interest on HOLC bonds, but in 1934 legislation to guarantee 
both principal and interest was enacted. See C. Lowell Harriss, History and Policies of the Home Owner’s Loan 
Corporation (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1951), 28–29. 
3  “Roosevelt Signs Home Loan Bill,” New York Times, June 13, 1933, 8.
4  Harriss, History and Policies, 1.
5  Ibid., 101, 107–8. 
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the three appraisal methods it used before originating the HOLC loan. The three methods 
were market comparables, replacement cost less depreciation, and capitalized rent stream.7 
For the purposes of determining what to do with property acquired in foreclosure, emphasis 
was placed on the rental valuation—a critically important concept when, like today, accurate 
sale comparables are hard to come by. In many cases, HOLC worked with the borrower to 
try to sell the property before foreclosing. The fact that the property ultimately proceeded to 
foreclosure was an indication of continued weakness in the for-sale market, suggesting that 
renting the property would maximize value to the corporation. 
HOLC properties were rented out on a month-to-month basis (which may have lowered 
the rents asked) by contract brokers, who were also responsible for property management. 
The brokers were allowed to make necessary repairs up to $25 without approval and spend up 
to $100 on an emergency basis, such as for a stove or heating. HOLC representatives would 
check properties annually to assess conditions. Maintenance costs on rented units totaled 
$26.8 million over the life of the corporation and equaled 19.3 percent of the gross rental 
income. As markets improved, rental properties were offered for sale. When a determination 
was made to sell a HOLC-owned property, either directly after acquisition or after a period 
of renting, local brokers (often the same ones who managed properties), under commission-
based contracts, listed and sold the properties. Advertising costs were paid by the brokers.8
Prices were set based on appraisals that indicated estimated sales prices based on varying 
levels of rehabilitation. The decision to rehabilitate for-sale properties was based on the 
anticipated return on that investment. The minimum value HOLC would accept for a prop-
erty was kept secret when the property was put up for sale. There was also HOLC oversight 
in setting the floor: any property offered for less than $1,000 but that was profitable to the 
HOLC or properties over $1,000 where the price reflected less than a 35 percent loss were 
approved by HOLC’s regional property committee; losses greater than 35 percent needed to 
be approved by a Home Office Property Committee.9 The actual offering price was often far 
higher than the reserve, but it rarely exceeded HOLC’s costs. 
HOLC was often forced to finance its own sales, both because as a government entity 
it could obtain better rates and because other lenders were unwilling to take on the risk. 
HOLC required a down payment that averaged 12.2 percent nationally (New York and New 
Jersey down payments were higher) and a year’s taxes and insurance in escrow, but the down 
payment would vary with creditworthiness and local standards. The down payment was 
designed to cover, at a minimum, HOLC’s anticipated costs should the new owner default 
on the loan.10 
7   Ibid., 41, 110.
8   Ibid., 114.
9   Ibid.
10   Harriss, 116–18.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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From this summary, we think four HOLC innovations and practices stand out, as well as 
a few important lessons. First, the 15-year fully amortizing loan was a major breakthrough in 
mortgage finance. Second, the corporation was rigorous in its appraisal practices, both when 
initially making a loan and when putting a foreclosed property up for sale. In part this was 
a matter of risk management, but it was also an attempt not to add to a downward market 
spiral. Third, the agency had a clear understanding both that it was a temporary entity and 
that real estate markets are highly localized. This led to the heavy reliance on a network of 
contract brokers and others. Fourth, when faced with the choice of continuing to hold onto 
a property for which it had a credit-worthy buyer or financing the buyer itself, it chose to 
self-finance. 
As to lessons, we think a clear one is that when a government agency is tasked with the 
job of cleaning up after a major financial disaster, success is mitigating and spreading out over 
time the effects of the problem. The HOLC’s 20 percent default rate in a rising market may 
look troubling today, but the question is “compared to what?” It almost certainly reduced 
the suffering of both homeowners and markets at a very troubled time. Moreover, best esti-
mates are that profits from the HOLC’s lending operations were slightly larger than losses 
on foreclosures.
The Resolution Trust Corporation
The Resolution Trust Corporation came into existence with the passage of FIRREA in 
August 1989, which transferred conservatorship of just over 250 failed thrifts from the FSLIC 
to the RTC. By the end of 1990, the RTC had taken over 531 thrifts with $278 billion in 
assets. This represented slightly more than two-thirds of the assets ultimately under the RTC’s 
responsibility. The volume of new assets dropped to $79 billion in 1991 and dropped again 
to $44 billion in 1992, the last year with any significant inflows to the RTC. Nearly half 
(48 percent) of the RTC’s assets were commercial and residential mortgages, with the other 
half a combination of REO (properties foreclosed upon by failed banks as well as bank real 
estate such as branch locations), other loans, securities, and other assets, including subsidiary 
corporations.11
In contrast to HOLC, whose primary task was to refinance mortgages, with asset disposi-
tion a consequence of the inevitable failure of some of that financing, the RTC was about 
asset disposition from the start. Moreover, only about $3 billion of the $402 billion of 
assets that passed through the RTC consisted of residential real estate.12 The RTC’s enabling 
legislation emphasized maximizing returns and minimizing losses, minimizing the impact 
on local real estate, and maximizing affordable housing preservation. As should be obvious, 
at least two of these goals are inherently in conflict. While the RTC was initially expected 
11 Authors’ calculation based on FDIC data available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/managing/Chron. 
See also Managing the Crisis: The FDIC and RTC Experience (Washington, DC: FDIC, August 1998), 298. 
12 Managing the Crisis, 390. Community Development INVESTMENT REVIEW 47
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to take many years to dispose of all its assets, the organization, staffed heavily with recruits 
from the bank regulatory agencies and under constant funding pressures, determined that 
maximizing returns meant moving quickly to reduce the properties’ drag on the market, 
especially in Texas. The RTC received its final funding from Congress in 1993 and closed up 
shop in 1995.
The RTC disposed of assets through a variety of channels—direct sales, auctions, secu-
ritization, and a small number of joint ventures with private firms. The corporation relied 
heavily on private firms to evaluate, package, and sell assets, which was both a matter of direc-
tion from Congress and a matter of necessity. Servicing performing loans was contracted out 
to conventional mortgage servicers until disposition, while nonperforming loans, REO, and 
other assets were offered to contractors to process for disposition. 
From 1991 to 1993, 91 contractors won 199 contracts for the RTC’s Standard Asset 
Management and Disposition Agreements (SAMDAs) to handle assets of $48.5 billion, a 
small fraction of which was residential real estate.13 The contracts were for three years, with 
two optional one-year extensions, depending on the number of outstanding assets. The 
SAMDAs set up management, disposition, and incentive fees but did not cover overhead 
costs. Firms bidding for SAMDA contracts would offer bids on their management and dispo-
sition fees; the incentive fee structure was fixed by the RTC for all contracts and paid a 20 
percent bonus on the disposition fee for assets sold in the first year of the contract and ten 
percent in the second year. The SAMDAs further required engaging other private-sector firms 
and employees by mandating subcontracts for appraisals, REO brokerage, property manage-
ment, and the like. In total, 12 services required subcontractors under SAMDA. A change to 
the program in January 1992 dropped disposition from contracts as the RTC moved toward 
a national, multi-asset disposition model that improved net recovery and shortened holding 
times over individual asset sales.14
The SAMDA program’s record was somewhat mixed relative to similar contract programs 
run through the FDIC. Real estate expense ratios were higher under the SAMDA program, 
but the asset quality in the SAMDA program was worse, which accounts for some of the 
discrepancy.  All  together,  the  $48  billion  in  book  value  of  assets  disposed  of  through 
SAMDAs returned net collections of $19 billion, for a recovery rate of 41 percent. The 
overall expense-to-collection ratio was 19 percent. Real estate sales accounted for 40 percent 
of the book-value reductions but 70 percent of the disposition fees.15 
In addition to disposing of real estate through SAMDA, the RTC used a direct sale 
approach, and later shifted to auctions as the volume of properties became too great to 
handle directly. To address concerns about flooding local markets with large numbers of 
distressed properties for sale, the RTC was under a mandate not to sell properties for less 
13  Ibid., 333–34.
14   For a full description of the SAMDA program, see Managing the Crisis, 354–69. 
15  Managing the Crisis, 361, 368. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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than 95 percent of value in direct sales or under the SAMDA contracts. Under the auction 
program rules established in March 1991, an absolute floor of 70 percent of value was set. In 
practice, the actual floor varied with each auction.16 
Residential real estate, a combination of single-family homes and multifamily buildings, 
was funneled through the RTC’s Affordable Housing Disposition Program (AHDP). Over 
all, the RTC sold 91,000 units of multifamily housing and another 28,000 single-family 
homes through the AHDP. Another 25,000 multifamily and 14,000 single family units were 
sold outside the AHDP. As noted, residential real estate represented about one half of one 
percent of the $402 billion in book value of assets that passed through the RTC. Seventy 
percent of the multifamily properties were in the South and West, and nearly 30 percent of 
the single-family properties were in Texas.17 
Multifamily properties were initially sold through a clearinghouse process with sale to 
the highest bidder. Multifamily property sold through the AHDP had use restrictions for 
40 years, during which 35 percent of the units needed to be rented to households below 80 
percent of area median income. In addition, 20 percent of the units were to be rented to 
households below 50 percent of area median income (AMI). Single-family houses were also 
deed restricted, but eligibility extended up to 115 percent of AMI. At closing, buyers were 
obligated to sign certificates of intent to occupy the property and to certify income eligi-
bility. There was also a one-year recapture provision that allowed the RTC to take 75 percent 
of the profits of a sale that took place within a year of closing. Single-family properties could 
be sold directly to income-qualified households or to local housing nonprofits, who were 
obligated to rehabilitate the properties and rent them or sell them to households meeting the 
eligibility requirements.18
The RTC engaged in several activities to speed the disposition of its assets under the 
AHDP and improve the outcomes for buyers. First, the RTC engaged local nonprofits to 
provide pre-purchase counseling to prospective buyers as well as post-purchase seminars on 
owner responsibilities like maintenance, mortgage payments, and insurance. Nonprofits also 
provided technical assistance to public housing authorities seeking to purchase the RTC’s 
multifamily buildings. Second, the RTC established a seller financing program for both 
single- and multifamily properties, in recognition of the difficulty many potential purchasers 
had in finding suitable financing, including through the FHA. RTC loans were offered for up 
to 97 percent of the value of single-family homes, with the RTC also covering closing costs. 
Approximately 20 percent of single-family sales involved RTC financing. In addition, the 
RTC would provide up to $5,000 to repair single-family homes in inventory, in recognition 
of the fact that low- and moderate-income buyers would likely be unable to afford repairs.19
16  Ibid., 328–29. 
17  Ibid., 376–77. 
18  Ibid., 375.
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In May 1992, the RTC changed how it sold multifamily properties, from sale to the 
highest bidder with use restrictions to direct sales through a series of sales windows. Public 
agencies were given the first 30-day opportunity to buy a property. If the property was unsold 
after 30 days, nonprofits would be given a chance, and if it remained unsold after that time, 
the property would go into a clearinghouse for anyone to purchase within 90 days. Buyers 
would have to commit to the affordable unit set-asides described previously. Only after a 
property failed to sell through the clearinghouse would the RTC place it for sale outside the 
AHDP. Under FIRREA, Congress established a similar 90-day marketing period for single-
family houses for public agencies, nonprofits, and qualified buyers.20
The innovation for which the RTC is best remembered is the commercial mortgage-
backed security. But while residential real estate was a relatively minor part of the RTC’s 
activities, the RTC was responsible for several important innovations in that area, especially 
with respect to protecting housing affordability. These include working through nonprofits 
and local housing authorities, use restrictions, the tiered sale process, and systems to provide 
counseling to new homeowners. Like HOLC, the RTC provided some seller financing and 
assisted in upgrading many of its properties before or as part of their disposition. 
HUD’s Asset Control Area Program
The final asset disposition program we discuss is HUD’s Asset Control Area program, 
the only one of these programs still in existence. The ACA program was initially authorized 
in 1998 as a pilot program to dispose of 40,000 FHA-foreclosed properties while stabilizing 
communities and reducing opportunities for speculative buying, superficially fixing and flip-
ping properties.21 It has since become a permanent program.
Within each asset control area, housing intermediaries, originally acting on behalf of 
local governments but now directly contracting with HUD for preferred bulk purchasing 
rights, agree to purchase FHA-owned properties, rehabilitate them, and resell them as afford-
able housing. The FHA sales price is determined by appraisal and discounted to account 
for necessary rehabilitation. Early ACA programs were in Chicago,22 Cleveland, and Los 
Angeles, among other places.23
One of the central components of the ACA program is its narrow geographic focus. ACA 
program participants submit a plan to HUD that identifies specific census tracts for targeted 
investment, affordability requirements, counseling programs, marketing plans, sales projec-
tions, and quality-control measures. Once a contract is reached with HUD, ACA participants 
20  Ibid., 380, 381.
21 Jennifer Blake, “Innovations in Community Development: Rebuilding Neglected Los Angeles Communi-
ties,” Enterprise Community Partners, 2004, available at http://www.practitionerresources.org/showdoc.
html?id=19723.
22  See http://www.chicagoareahousing.org/AssistPgm_Detail.asp?pgmid=338&newlayout=.
23  “Industry News,” Shelterforce, January–February 2001.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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are obligated to purchase all HUD-owned single-family homes within the designated area, up 
to an annual cap. For example, Enterprise’s Dallas ACA program committed to buying 100 
homes per year during its two-year contract.24 
After receiving notice of HUD-owned properties in the area, the nonprofit has a short 
period of time in which to inspect the properties and itemize needed repairs. HUD then sells 
the properties to the nonprofit at a discount of at least 50 percent of as-is appraised value. 
Purchases are funded through credit facilities provided by local lenders, often with interest 
reserves funded by the city.25
Once  the  nonprofit  acquires  the  properties,  it  begins  rehabilitation.  Rehabilitation 
includes lead and asbestos abatement, improving energy efficiency, and repairing major 
building systems to provide a minimum 10-year service period. Substantial rehabilitation 
can cost as much as $150,000 per property, but it varies significantly by market. Enterprise 
reports that in Los Angeles, the average cost of acquisition and rehabilitation was $235,000 
per property.26 The cost in Rochester was approximately one-third of that.27 In Dallas, reha-
bilitation alone costs an average of $25–30,000, but there is a significant range, with new 
properties needing as little as $11,000 and older, wood frame properties with deteriorated 
foundations costing as much as $70,000.28
Once a property has been rehabilitated, it is offered for sale to low- and moderate-income 
buyers. Pricing is set based on a strict formula: acquisition costs, plus rehabilitation costs, 
plus a 15 percent markup. At the time of sale, the property is appraised, and the difference 
between the appraised value and sales price is captured by a soft second note held by HUD 
for three years. If the owner stays in the property for three years after purchase, the soft 
second is extinguished and the equity is transferred to the owner.29
Eligibility is determined by the terms of the ACA agreement with HUD. Unlike HOLC 
or the RTC, which offered seller financing, ACA program participants are unable to finance 
prospective buyers. In many cases, the nonprofits or local government will offer down-pay-
ment assistance or other subsidies, but the bulk of the purchase price must be met with 
other financing. For example, the city of Dallas offers buyers below 80 percent of AMI up to 
$10,000 in down-payment assistance.30 To protect buyers from predatory lending practices, 
all financing arrangements must be approved by the nonprofit. Two-thirds of buyers in the 
24 Author interview with Richard Pine, EHOP–Dallas, April 29, 2008.
25 Jennifer Blake, “Innovations in Community Development: Rochester Housing Development Fund Corpora-
tion: Renovating Houses and Rebuilding Lives,” Enterprise Community Partners, 2006.
26 Blake, 2004.
27 Blake, 2006.
28 Richard Pine, April 29, 2008.
29 Ibid.
30 See http://www.dallascityhall.com/html/home_buyer_assistance_programs.html.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO
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Dallas ACA program rely on FHA financing.31 Buyers must complete pre-purchase coun-
seling to be eligible to buy a home through the program.
Anecdotally, the ACA program has been effective in stabilizing communities that previ-
ously had high rates of foreclosures. The program’s success is now being challenged, however, 
by the fact that lenders are tightening credit standards, which makes it difficult for prospec-
tive buyers to purchase rehabilitated properties. This increases the risk to nonprofits of partic-
ipating in the program. The program is difficult to make work in highly distressed communi-
ties because of HUD’s rigid pricing structure, as well as program rules that determine profit 
and loss on a per-property basis rather than at the portfolio level, which would allow a small 
measure of cross-subsidization. ACA programs rarely include the most distressed neighbor-
hoods because there is no way for participants to cover their costs.32 
While the ACA’s rigid rules make it a less than perfect model for dealing with today’s 
foreclosure crisis, the program has provided those who have used it with valuable experience. 
ACA participants are starting to apply the knowledge and experience they gained under the 
ACA program to make bulk purchases of properties from private servicers. 
Conclusion
What can we learn from these three experiences? We think there are three big lessons. 
First, achieving the balance among maximizing returns, stabilizing markets, maintaining or 
enhancing affordability, minimizing government outlays, and getting the job done quickly 
is hard—and pressures are constant to accomplish all five goals simultaneously. Second, the 
entity that undertakes the task must have multiple skills—asset manager, property manager, 
contract manager, financier, and coalition builder among them. Third, the job will require 
flexibility and innovation. Both the HOLC and the RTC, maligned as “cowboys” in their 
day, are in retrospect remembered as flexible and innovative entities. In contrast, the rigidity 
of the ACA program has limited its utility.
Any new disposition program will face not only the old questions, but new ones that 
reflect changes in both sensibility and law since even the early 1990s. For example, what will 
be the impact of modern landlord-tenant law on strategies that envision use of single-family 
properties temporarily for rental housing? Are income-based eligibility requirements appro-
priate in all cases, and if not, how should they be used? What is the effect of such criteria on 
the communities in which the homes are located? To what extent have these been mixed-in-
come communities, and is the maintenance or expansion of mixed-income neighborhoods a 
goal? How do we best harness the capacity and discipline of the for-profit sector alongside the 
nonprofit and governmental sectors? And finally, can we abide the “cowboy” flexibility and 
innovation that a temporary entity might be able to exercise—and can we find anyone in this 
day of “gotcha” politics and journalism who would take the job of leading such an entity? 
31 EHOP–Dallas, Enterprise Profile Report, March 27, 2008.
32 Richard Pine interview, April 29, 2008.To state the obvious, none of this will take place in a political vacuum. We began by 
acknowledging that the properties being disposed of came into public hands as a result of 
taxpayer funds used in an earlier transaction. With public funding comes not only public 
purpose but politics. Congressional pressure to liquidate the HOLC as its outstanding loan 
balances declined meant selling off mortgages to local banks sooner than a profit-maxi-
mizing strategy would have dictated.33 The RTC was under constant political pressure to get 
the job done quickly with no money, which definitely influenced the corporation’s strategy 
and operations. And of course the RTC was subject to three arguably inconsistent mandates: 
maximizing profit, minimizing local market distortion, and enhancing affordable housing.34 
It is probably too much to ask, but there is something to be said for setting priorities in law 
rather than leaving it to the bureaucracy to figure out.
In the end, the question is, What are our overall goals? What types of communities do we 
envision ten years from now in the places with large numbers of foreclosed properties? Can 
we fundamentally change the boom-and-bust cycles in these communities that seem to 
recur in 20-year intervals? How can we use this crisis to improve our stock of quality, afford-
able  rental  housing?  And—maybe  biggest  of  all—what  is  the  role  of  homeownership  in 
America?
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33   Harriss, Histories and Policies, 6.
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